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Introduction:
“A revolutionary movement with such qualities and characteristics may bend in the wind but will
not break, because its roots reach the very depth of the nation and it draws on the nation's
heritage and history and is inspired both from heaven and earth.”1
On December 16, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a twenty-six-year-old Tunisian street
vendor, went about his regular nightly routine. He walked to his local market with his handcart to
purchase around two hundred dollars worth of produce to sell the next day.2 Every day,
Bouzazizi would go through this ritual of borrowing to buy the produce he would need to sell on
the side of the road. These long days were essential, as Bouzazizi saw this as the only way to
support his family and put his sisters through University and school. Yet, often, his efforts would
only yield about five dollars per day in profits.3
Nevertheless, he woke up every day and would not go home until he sold all his
inventory. The following day, while setting up his produce stand on the side of the road, as he
has done for years, he was approached by local police officers. Quickly, they began to harass him
for not possessing a street vendor permit. The harassment picked up as Bouazizi expressed his
inability to pay bribes to the police officers. Then, a female officer began to humiliate him:
slapping him, spitting in his face, confiscating his electronic scale, stealing produce from him,
and tipping the contents of his cart into the streets publicly.4 This was a daily occurrence, and he

1

Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya, no. 11, November 1979 taken from Bengio (1998), pp. 17
Abouzeid, Rania, and Sidi Bouzid. “Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire.”
Time, Time Inc., 21 Jan. 2011,
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html.
3
IBID.
4
Fahim, Kareem. "Slap to a man’s pride set off tumult in Tunisia." New York Times 21 (2011).
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often was forced to pay bribes that were larger than the five dollars he earned daily.5 This was all
because the local government refused to give him a permit. But, this time, Bouzazizi was fed up.
He was tired and especially frustrated by the public humiliation and harassment from the police
preventing him from making a humble living. He felt trapped and was tired of an economy and
government that left him stranded and unable to make a fair living.
Following the incident with the police officer, Bouazizi marched to the governor's office
to air his grievances. The staff at the municipal building refused to hear his concerns or schedule
a meeting for him to discuss what happened. Within an hour of being dismissed, Bouazizi made
his way to a local gas station and purchased a can of gasoline. Finally, he stood in the street in
front of the governor's office and shouted, "how do you expect me to make a living?" as he
doused his body with gasoline and lit himself on fire in protest.6 He was frustrated with his
treatment by government officials and the police. Beyond that, he was frustrated with a system
that left little hope for economic or social prosperity for him or his fellow young man. There
were no jobs, education, or opportunities for him besides selling on the side of the road, and he
could not even do that. Within a couple of hours, people quickly began to mobilize in disgust
with the events earlier in the day. Beginning in Sidi Bouzid and promptly spreading throughout
Tunisia, citizens began to rise in collective disgust and disappointment with their government
that ruled over a system that left millions unemployed, unemployable, and impoverished. At the
same time, the older generation and political elites enjoyed comfortable lives.

5

Beaumont, Peter. "Mohammed Bouazizi: the dutiful son whose death changed Tunisia’s fate."
The Guardian 20 (2011).
6
Sengupta, Kim. "Tunisia:‘I Have Lost My Son, but I Am Proud of What He Did.’." The
Independent (2011).
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Across the Arab World, Bouazizi's message and frustration with the government and the
economy resonated with millions of other Middle Easterners who would eventually start similar
revolutions in their home countries.7 However, unlike any prior revolution, this group of
revolutionaries was bound not by political affiliation but by age and common circumstances.
This grassroots movement was initiated, led, and fueled by young men aged 15-29. This cohort
has long been displaced from traditional Arab society and the economies of the Middle East. In
the lead-up to the Arab Spring, this cohort faced unprecedented unemployment, lacked adequate
education for the modern economy, and faced increased familial and societal pressure to achieve
family formation and get married. As a result, there was a "coming of age" crisis that froze Arab
youth in a pre-adult phase as marriages were delayed, they could not achieve financial
independence, and they failed to progress.
Consequently, there was widespread (and quickly growing) discontent among this cohort
with the government that they felt was failing to meet their social contract obligations, such as
providing them with employment, adequate education, food, the chance of opportunity, and
unable to provide a stable launchpad for their progress toward adulthood. As a result, the
political mobilization that began in Tunisia spread to capitals across the region. As part of these
protests, young men in Algeria, Syria, Kuwait, and Iraq openly expressed their grievances with
their governments via demonstrations. Additionally, widespread campaigns led to the ouster of
political leaders in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen.

For the purposes of this paper, the “Arab world” consists of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The terms ``Arab world,” Middle East,
and “the region” may be used interchangeably.
7
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As more young men in the region grew discontent with underlying social issues, they
turned to advocate for political remedies via channels that have yet to be used in revolutions,
namely, through social media activism, concerts, and distinctly non-violent protests across most
of the Arab world. Thus, it is essential to study the Arab Spring youth movement to understand
how the social informs the political and understand what the next generation of revolutions will
look like; distinctly grassroots and lacking the bloody or aggressive aspects of the past. If the
trends of the Arab Spring persist, revolutions will be informed more by the youth than society's
older generations.
This thesis will further advance protest triggers research by exploring the linkages
between states failing to meet their social contract obligations, feelings of relative deprivation,
the psychology of circumstance, the Middle Eastern cultural backdrop, and a desire to revolt and
protest. Essentially, this thesis will explore the impact on Egyptian and Tunisian men’s political
behavior and attitudes when they felt that their country was depriving them of the necessities of
life that they had come to expect over time, such as education, employment, and
opportunity—focusing on the impact that occurs when there is a gap between what is expected to
be provided and what is being provided. The thesis will give a holistic review of how social and
economic shortcomings drove the political and later revolutionary actions in Egypt and Tunisia.
Importantly, this study evaluates the crisis through the lens of men. At first, the choice to focus
on men is rooted in an analysis of the Arab Springs accidental “founder” Mohamed Bouazizi.
The movement began as a direct result of the actions of a man consumed by societal pressure, a
desire to support his family, and frustration with outdated gender norms. At the beginning of the
conflict, the first audience captured was men who resonated with his message before the
movement spread and expanded beyond gendered lines. The progression of the campaign lends

10

itself to focusing on men. Although, the centrality of men in this study is rooted more in a desire
to build off existing literature that ties male disenfranchisement, the inability to marry or find
sustained employment as a powerful driver of political conflict and violence. Essentially, when
men experience social or gender-based frustration, they are more likely to engage in various
forms of conflict.
Furthermore, rooting this study in the existing literature on male plight driving conflict
avoids elements of orientalism while also allowing a presentation of the unique cultural backdrop
of the region. Typically, studies of the Middle East that include conversations about cultural
norms tend to exoticize the Middle East and its citizens. Studies typically will describe the region
as an exception to prevailing theories. Although, painting a comprehensive and broad-stroke
picture of men globally leaves room to present the region and the male cultural experience not as
an exception to the traditional path that men face but as emblematic of these trends.
My two case studies will investigate the pre-revolution economic landscape in Egypt and
Tunisia. Additionally, it will examine the social norms around financial independence, family
formation, and young-male behavior in the region. Finally, when men cannot experience
financial independence, achieve family formation, obtain meaningful employment, or get an
education, I will explore how they grow discontent with their government and manifest desires to
protest, revolt, and seek political change.
I have selected Egypt and Tunisia as my case studies for several reasons. First, there is
sizable literature that maps and explains the cultural norms that drive male daily life in both
countries. Importantly, revealing the emphasis and pressure placed on men to achieve financial
independence, marry, and hit specific milestones that mark adulthood. An abundance of
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quantitative data for both countries paints the economic circumstances that citizens faced in the
region, including employment rates, education levels, average income, and marriage rates.
Finally, there is also an abundance of academic literature that tracks the opinions of protestors
and details the grievances that protestors raised on the ground. However, all this literature is
independent of one another and is not synthesized to paint a holistic picture of why young men
specifically drove protest efforts and, ultimately, revolutions. The prevailing literature instead
emphasizes political factors such as a desire for regime change and democratization to explain
the crisis. This incorrectly oversimplifies a complex social landscape and demographic crisis
disproportionately impacting young men. Therefore, my thesis will address the gap in the
respective literature and synthesize the economic, social, and cultural situations that propagated a
"coming of age" crisis among young men that were ill-equipped for a modern economy and
displaced from Arab society. My thesis aims to profile the average protestor and explain why
men linked together to topple the existing system.
Accordingly, I will address the following research question in my thesis. How did social
dissatisfaction and a "coming of age crisis" among Egyptian and Tunisian young men inform
their advocacy and the events of the Arab Spring? In answering this question, I will also address
several more minor queries. First, why were Egyptian and Tunisian young men particularly
dissatisfied socially? Second, what was the social contract they had with their governments?
Third, what is relative deprivation, and why is this a proper explanation for what Middle East
men were experiencing? In my case study of Egypt and Tunisia, I will examine the fifteen years
before the start of the Arab Spring to contextualize the dire economic situation that the
generation that led the protests and revolutions of the Arab Spring grew up in. I will also
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examine the period their parents grew up in to contrast it with theirs to explain how the coming
of age crisis is unique to the current youth generation in the region.
Chapter Outline:
The first chapter will lay the groundwork for my substantive hypothesis that the Arab
Spring was driven by a youth “coming of age crisis” where young men uniquely faced
discrimination, economic hardship, unemployment, and the inability to hit certain milestones
associated with adulthood which pushed them to mobilize. The chapter will survey and address
the existing scholarship on the broader concepts and theories that will later be applied directly to
both the Middle East as a region and after the two case countries individually.
Chapter two will outline the research design and elaborate on why the two case studies
were chosen. First, in the research design section, I will lay out the critical variables that must be
addressed to paint the fullest picture of the conditions on the ground that drove men to protest
and revolt. Secondly, the chapter will address both the similarities and differences between the
two case studies and how they are similar enough that it is fruitful to study both of them as
examples of my hypothesis rooted in theories of male behavior.
The third chapter will build off the literature review and begin to contextualize the dire
economic and social conditions that drove dissatisfaction all across the region amongst young
men. Importantly, this chapter will tackle the undertones of a demographic crisis, the widespread
regional unemployment and underemployment, educational issues, and issues within the job
market. Beyond laying out the economic factors, this chapter will dig deeper into the social
implications and norms around young male behavior and maturation in the region to highlight
that young men are denied access to many life events that usually mark a transition into
13

adulthood. This is critical because it will explain why the men were so discontent with their
governments that they scheduled widespread protests and revolutions. This will isolate important
norms and metrics for the later dive into the individual case countries. This chapter will include
graphs that visualize and elaborate on the data previewed in the literature review and academic
research.
Following the broader regional contextualization, I will devote the next two chapters to
the dual cases of Egypt and Tunisia and the Egyptian and Jasmine revolutions, respectively. For
each country, I will first outline the political and economic history of the nations. Following that
analysis, I will investigate what drove social dissatisfaction first by explaining the economic
conditions that young men faced by presenting data and research on unemployment, marriage,
education, and financial wellbeing in each country to show the undue pressure and dire situations
that men faced which drove their desire for political change, protest, and revolution. Secondly, I
will examine the social norms behind achieving financial and familial milestones to explain why
Tunisian and Egyptian men were so frustrated. Finally, following that analysis, I will review the
two countries' social contracts further to show social and political frustration sources.
Importantly, I will ensure symmetry in the information presented, ensuring that the two case
studies are easily comparable in the subsequent chapter.
My final chapter will serve several purposes; first, as a comparison of the two cases and
as a conclusion to my arguments. Second, I will compare the economic, political, and economic
factors that drove desires for protest, revolution, and political change in the respective case
studies. Next, this chapter will reaffirm the importance of studying civil conflict's social,
normative, and psychological backgrounds to unpack events such as the Arab Spring truly.

14

Finally, this chapter will lay out future research considerations and topics to advance scholarship
on the Arab Spring.

15

Chapter One: Literature Review
Grouping the Theories
Before engaging in a case-study analysis focusing on the specific drivers of protestors in
individual countries around the world (including Arab Spring countries), it is first necessary to
zoom out and look at the theoretical explanations that create a generalized framework to
understand what motivates citizens to protest and revolt against their government. Doing so
prevents getting bogged down and relying on unimportant and minor factors. Generally, the
theoretical views focus on a grievance model. Thus, the driver of protests and revolution is
citizens' grievances with their state. However, in the two ruling theories, there is a contention on
what emotions drive grievances. The first theory focuses on grievances linked to experiencing
economic inequality. The second challenges the first and argues that social inequality is
insufficient to push people to rise. Instead, it is the negative feelings experienced when social
contract expectations (what citizens expect their states to provide) are not realized due to state
ineptness.
Starting with economic inequality as a driver of protests and revolution is helpful.
Edward Muller asserts that “almost all of the revolutions which have changed the aspect of
nations have been made to consolidate or destroy social (economic) inequality.”8 In this view,
citizens seek revolution and overthrow their governments when they feel the economic system is
not fairly distributing property and wealth and leaves no opportunities to experience financial
prosperity. Essentially, citizens are compelled to revolt when they see that their prospects of
opportunity are not on par with their peers in higher social classes. The focus for citizens is their
8

Muller, Edward N. “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence.”
American Sociological Review, vol. 50, no. 1, 1985, p. 47., https://doi.org/10.2307/2095339.
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level of economic well-being or having present and future financial security. More specifically,
their economic well-being is the ability to meet their basic needs consistently, including food,
housing, utilities, healthcare, transportation, education, child care, clothing, and paid taxes.9
Economic inequality is “toxic to social cohesion and harmful to political stability” in a country.10
As citizens experience inequality, there begins to be a fracturing of society. The have-nots
become dissatisfied with the government, which favors and resembles the “haves.” Thus, citizens
seek to overthrow their governments to better their collective situations and fight for a level
playing field.
The second and more compelling ruling theoretical approach similarly focuses on push
factors for citizen action in conflict. However, this theoretical approach written by Ted Gurr
takes a more expansive approach, seeking to serve as a general explanation for all political
violence or government dissatisfaction. His theory applies when there are “collective attacks
within a political community against the political regime, its actors-including competing political
groups as well as incumbents-or its policies."11 Essentially, this approach is far more inclusive of
all types of social conflict within a country. It loosely applies whenever there is an internal
conflict, including between different factions, between citizens and their government, or between
citizens and a specific policy. This framework extends to protesting just as much as it does
revolution (which covers all the events of the Arab Spring).

9

Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) - Working Definition of Economic Well-Being,
https://www.cswe.org/Centers-Initiatives/Initiatives/Clearinghouse-for-Economic-Well-Being/W
orking-Definition-of-Economic-Well-Being.
10
Ianchovichina, Elena, et al. “Why Are People Protesting?” Brookings, Brookings, 29 Jan.
2020,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/01/29/why-are-people-protestin
g/.
11
Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group, 2016, p.24
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Moreover, his model focuses less on living and experiencing social and economic
inequality as a driver of frustration or action. Instead, there is a focus on “relative deprivation,”
which is “actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value
capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they
are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they can get and
keep.12 For example, citizens grow frustrated when the realities of what their governments can
provide for them are not on par with what they collectively expect from their government.
Citizens expect their governments to provide them access to education, sustainable employment,
and family formation. When a government fails to meet these basic needs, its citizens grow
increasingly frustrated, not that they have less than others, but that they do not have the essential
tools that have been long-promised and delivered to past generations. This causes citizens to look
to protest, revolution, and other forms of civil conflict.
Feelings of relative deprivation can form due to several structural situations in society.
First, relative deprivation can develop when expectations remain constant while state capabilities
drop.13 This is known as decremental deprivation, and it is when your expectations for the
government remain the same, but their ability to deliver on them begins to falter. The second way
relative deprivation can form is via aspirational deprivation, or when your expectations rise while
what is provided remains the same.14 Essentially, citizens see better state-citizen arraignments in
other countries, changing their expectations. At the same time, the government fails to take
notice or adapt. Finally, relative deprivation can brew due to progressive deprivation—when
expectations grow, as does what the government delivers. Still, the government cannot keep up
12
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IBID,47
14
IBID,51
13

18

at the same rate.15 All of these structural arraignments equally evoke feelings of discontent and
disapproval with your government.
The impact of relative deprivation has immediate effects on human behavior and political
violence. The intensity, frequency, and scope in which feelings of relative deprivation are
experienced dictate the likelihood that collective violence such as protests or revolution occurs.
This is because relative deprivation evokes frustration due to your inability to achieve or obtain
what you expect.16 Essentially, citizens dwell on these negative feelings, and it begins to
compound, consuming what you think about and becoming your singular focus. Over time, as
frustration builds up, it switches to frustration-aggression, which is the “primary source of
human capacity for violence.”17 Overwhelmingly, feelings of relative deprivation energize
citizens and get them to rally behind violent political events such as revolutions and protests.
This theoretical approach provides the most compelling explanation for the Arab Spring and the
actions of Middle Eastern citizens.
Defining A Social Contract
In times of political conflict, it is essential to evaluate state-society relations to tease out
the source of frustration citizens have with their government and understand why people protest
and revolt against their governments. Globally, many state-society relations are dictated by social
contracts, a “set of formal and informal agreements between societal groups and their sovereign
(government or another actor in power) on rights and obligations toward each other.”18
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Essentially, there is an informal and mutually agreed upon set of norms. The government
guarantees certain rights and provides specific resources in exchange for legitimacy of the
authority of the state over the individual. Scholars hold that social contracts exist as a “necessity
to overcome the natural state of anarchy.”19 Clearly established rules organize people and dictate
how the government and society must act. This prevents states of disorder or conflict from
occurring frequently. When these arraignments break down or fail, people and nations devolve
into internal strife. These informal social norms are highly localized and differ from place to
place. Typically, the default scope of these arraignments is either national or supranational and
regional (e.g., Middle East region).20 A clear understanding of social contracts is crucial to
understanding the rift created between the Middle East’s young adults and their governments
during the Arab Spring. In addition, it is vital to understand how behaviors and expectations are
designed to understand why they break down within a specific society.
Trust and Political Discontent During Dire Economic Conditions
In many nations, the relationships that everyday citizens have with their governments are
incredibly complicated and ever-changing. Most citizens live their entire life with little to no
direct interaction with their governments or the institutions that purportedly serve their interests.
For many, they will never engage in the decision-making process or work for these institutions.
For the everyday citizen, the only thing linking them to their government and the institutions that

Countries.’” World Development, vol. 145, 2021, p. 104982.,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104982.
19
McCandless, Erin. "Reconceptualizing the Social Contract in Contexts of Conflict, Fragility
and Fraught Transition." Wits School of Governance Working Paper Series (2018).
20
Rhodes, Martin. The future of European welfare: a new social contract?. Springer, 2016.
20

dictate their daily life is trust.21 These citizens trust that their government institutions, political
parties, and leaders will make policy and political decisions that benefit and protect the greater
good. The harmony of political trust and governments is essential to preserving the order. As
long as citizens trust their government institutions, leaders, and parties, the government can
continue to operate, and citizens will not take action. Of course, at various points, government
trust levels can shift based on current events.
A primary factor that citizens consider when assessing their levels of trust in the
government is the state of the economy.22 Generally, people trust their governments more if they
appear to have the capacity to generate economic growth, create jobs, and provide access to vital
social services in times of financial distress.23 People often find it challenging to judge their
government’s success in other areas because these policies have minimal impact on their
everyday lives and the impact is not immediately felt. Citizens judge their government most on
issues that hit close to home and are timely. Thus, citizens handpick which issues they use as the
ultimate barometer of their trust in government. Moreover, a considerable amount of distance
separates most citizens from the decisions that government leaders and institutions make. Thus,
citizens are “swayed most of all by the immediate and tangible circumstances of their private
lives,” such as the economy as a barometer of government progress. Even minor changes in
policy or government inaction can have profound effects.24 In times of economic trouble, citizens
21

Kroknes, Veronica Fagerland, Tor Georg Jakobsen, and Lisa-Marie Grønning. "Economic
Performance and Political Trust: The impact of the financial crisis on European citizens."
European Societies 17, no. 5 (2015): 700-723.
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MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. "Peasants or bankers? The
American electorate and the US economy." American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (1992):
597-611.
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Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. "Sociotropic politics: the American case." British
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21

begin to experience a decreased quality of life, social harm, unemployment, and other adverse
events. Alternatively, some scholars take a similar economic condition-centered approach but
focus more on “sociotropic” voting or political activity whereby citizens grow increasingly
distrustful of government not only because of their financial well-being but are concerned with
the economic well-being of the whole nation and respond as a unit.25 In both instances, citizens
will look to their governments for direction and blame these institutions for failing to meet their
obligations of safeguarding the economy and providing for their citizens. This has outsized
impacts on overall trust in government.
Adverse changes in economic conditions can prove incredibly corrosive to the
relationship between government and citizens. Since citizens look to their governments to
safeguard the economy when it either underperforms or experiences adverse events, their trust in
government quickly decreases. In many instances, the general sentiment of citizens’ distrust and
discontent around economic issues morphs into calls for dramatic action. Political trust is
essential to the stability of a political system. Beyond solely decreasing overall trust in
government, these economic conditions and distrust in government can have an outsized impact
in persuading large subsets of the population to convert their emotions into actions. Often
dubbed “economic voting,” the theory holds that worsening economic conditions quickly
energize a base of citizens and provide the fuel needed for citizens to organize behind actions
such as protests, increased voting, political activity, and sometimes revolution. As a result,
citizens collectively challenge the place that their current government, leaders, and political
system have in the world and in their daily lives.26 Immediately as trust is lost, the political
25

Hansford, Thomas G., and Brad T. Gomez. "Reevaluating the sociotropic economic voting
hypothesis." Electoral Studies 39 (2015): 15-25.
26
Burden, Barry C., and Amber Wichowsky. "Economic discontent as a mobilizer:
unemployment and voter turnout." The Journal of Politics 76, no. 4 (2014): 887-898.
22

sphere can divulge into a chaotic scene. Financial crises must be monitored closely by
governments as it leads to a reduction in trust and confidence in political institutions and
incentives citizens to take matters into their own hands. If governments ignore these
circumstances, they will create the foundation for higher discontent among the electorate, such as
in the Arab Spring.

Psychological Impact of Circumstance
In addressing the roots of political violence and conflicts between different social groups,
there is a tendency to focus solely on economic and social structures to explain why people act
the way they do and choose to protest and revolt. Importantly, this conversation ignores the
human element, the individual, and breezes over how people process or interpret their situations.
Behind every protest or revolution is a body of citizens experiencing emotions and reacting in a
specific way. Thus, it is essential to include a conversation on the mental element of conflict by
analyzing participants and digging deeper into their psychological states or drivers. There is
immense power and impact when someone goes through traumatic events, faces poor conditions,
and experiences inequality. It is crucial to look at this to understand why some people stand up
and revolt and others do not.
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Human nature overwhelmingly demands that we define ourselves by group affiliation.
Naturally, we organize ourselves into different sub-groups to share a common identity, set of
beliefs, and values. At the same time, we all differentiate and separate ourselves by having and
expressing a personal identity. At the same time, our natural psychology changes during difficult
and extenuating circumstances. In response to difficult life conditions, individuals “tend to turn
to existing or newly created groups for the fulfillment of basic needs such as security, identity,
and connection.”27 In conflict, the human psychological state reverts to a group mentality.
Humans look for a connection with others and want to feel a part of something larger than
themselves (such as revolutionary movements). Another significant part of this change in
psychology is how we look at our fellow man and other groups. In times of conflict, people will
typically pull their groups closer and dwell on the similarities between you and your group
members. On the flip side, people will increasingly focus on differences with other groups.
Humans are “ motivated to enhance the difference in favor of our group, to elevate our group
over others.”28 In times of conflict, human psychology negatively shifts toward rigid group
affiliation and creates wedges between different groups. Due to their dire circumstance, humans
are hardwired to look to movements or an ideological leader to relate to.29 This is crucial to
understanding political conflicts such as the Arab Spring. When young-male citizens (such as
those in Egypt and Tunisia) experience poor circumstances such as poverty, social
dissatisfaction, corruption, and bleak existence, they are more likely to group themselves and
engage in movements and widespread protest campaigns. This adds a lot of color to the Arab
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Spring Crisis. It makes it easier to explain why men could group themselves and build a
community around collective inequality and poor circumstances that only their cohort faced.
Once people have self-selected into rigid groups while experiencing difficult times, their
psychology and behavior again change. Their focus shifts from finding a group to engaging in
this group. While in the group, what becomes important is what the group sees as important. As
groups organize, people rally around a specific goal or idea.30 This psychological shift is vital to
understanding revolutions (such as the Arab Spring). As groups begin to formulate opinions,
they quickly gain traction as group members agree just because their fellow group members do.
That makes it easier to understand how people mobilize around toppling a government, seeking
revolution, or protesting. As part of this psychological change, the passion often breeds more
drastic and violent action in the name of your fellow groupmate. Again, this reveals how
revolutions form around mutual feelings of discontent with your circumstances.
Situational human psychology again is relevant when you look at the effects of
victimization or the impact of facing dire circumstances due to government ineptness. Persistent
discrimination and inequality have a powerful psychological effect on the victim. Namely, it
leads to heightened psychological desires for hostilities and revenge.31 Essentially, their
psychology is rewired when citizens (such as those in Egypt and Tunisia) are repeatedly
victimized and face dire economic, social, and structural issues. As a result, they are more likely
(and willing) to resort to drastic measures to improve their circumstance and get even with who
they perceive to be at fault. Again, this is important to understand why so many young men were
willing to overthrow their governments in Tunisia and Egypt. Their altered psychological state
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was the perfect breeding ground for extreme action and a focus on revenge on the political
establishment and institutions that have repeatedly displaced and failed them.
Youth
In political science and economic research, interesting conceptual questions arise when
defining the meaning of youth and evaluating their agencies. Therefore, surveying the
scholarship on the matter is vital to studying the Arab Spring and isolating who contributed most
to the movement and why they did so. Notably, several camps with varying definitions and
perceptions of who should be included in the youth cohort for academic research.
The most straightforward approach to defining youth is to set age range parameters. This
method is often used by international organizations such as the World Development Agency,
limiting the group definition to those between 15 and 25 years old.32 The ranges can vary and
include older people as part of the youth cohort. Some use 15-29, and others include up until the
age of 40 as part of this cohort. This contingent relies heavily on both life stage and generation as
part of their definition. Even though operationalization makes it easier to study a group or
subject, the process of handpicking various age ranges and setting cutoffs is inherently arbitrary.
Many scholars reject this approach and instead argue that “youth” is a constructed social
identity defined by non-youth about youths.33 Essentially, the process of determining who fits
within the label of youth is led by other members of society that differentiate themselves from
people younger in age and call them young and immature. Often, scholars, governments, and
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society construct images of youth and create molds for them to exist within. Generally, these
preconceived traits paint youth as rebellious, adventurous, risky, and full of energy.34 This
approach, however, ignores how youth assign themselves, feel, or think about themselves. It is
left to others to dictate who and what should be considered a youth and to set expectations for
them.
A vital component is lacking in the aforementioned theoretical approaches to defining
youth and understanding their agency. All of these perspectives ignore how youth define
themselves. Including the youth perspective allows us to identify the specific traits that shape
their behavior and the images of themselves. Often, we rely too heavily on externally constructed
images that objectify youth and oversimplify this critical cohort. It is essential to understand
what youth believe is valuable and important to understand what drives their behavior.
Attempting to define what youth are without asking for their input leaves us to guess how they
feel, why they think that way, and why they react a certain way.
The most compelling approach to defining youth dually evaluates social conditions and
youth’s self-perceptions. Scholars contend that youthhood is related partially to the life stage
they are in and their position within the greater social structure.35 The condition of youthhood is
that you are navigating between childhood (time of vulnerability, innocence, and need for
protection) with adulthood (the world of responsibility and work). Theoretically, youth
experience a certain degree of structural irresponsibility. It is acceptable to depend on their
parents and are not expected to be responsible for others like children or relatives. You are
supposed to “behave young” or exemplify certain mental and cognitive dispositions defining
34
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their ways of being, feelings, and behavior.36 This socialized approach leaves room for variance
in behavior. Acknowledging that people in various subgroups experience conditions differently
allows for studies of youth to be far more dynamic and less restrictive without rigid exclusion for
people that act the same way and experience the same conditions they did before aging out of the
preset youth age ranges. Essentially, it is vital to focus on people's positionality within the social
landscape. This approach allows people to remain labeled as youth even if they have progressed
in age but still exemplify the behaviors they did before. Alternatively, younger people taking on
more responsibility and independence are labeled as adults despite their relatively young age.
People mature at varying stages, and the way they act is a more significant determinant of their
status than their age. People do not behave the same just because they are the same age. People
react similarly when they face similar social structures and experiences and contend with norms.
Young Adults and Young Men: Propensity for Violence
As a cohort, young adults and men specifically have distinct reactions to the previously
addressed structural, economic, demographic, and psychological events. Thus, it is critical to
evaluate further how this population thinks, what motivates them, and how they behave to
understand further their role in igniting and participating in civil, political, and violent conflict
such as the Arab Spring. Therefore, in this study, it is helpful to contextualize young adults
broadly and then further evaluate young men independently.
Starting with youth populations first, this population has repeatedly shown a unique
ability to participate in and launch civil and political conflict. Countries that experience
demographic crises such as “youth bulges,” when the growth of the youth population outpaces
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older generations, are more likely to develop into violent political events. Essentially, when there
is a demographic pattern where a large share of the population comprises young adults and
children, governments often fluster and fail to address these crises’. When the government or the
economy is equipped to handle these structural issues, there is “an increase in the opportunities
and motives for political violence (including civil war, revolution, and civil conflict).”37 These
structural conditions create suboptimal life conditions which anger people and get them to take
action they otherwise would not. Namely, it creates an abundant supply of youths with low
opportunity costs and an increased risk of experiencing “institutional overcrowding, particularly
unemployment.”38 Structurally, large youth populations have more young-adults than jobs or
resources. Therefore, there are significant hurdles to achieving the critical goals of societal
progressions, such as economic prosperity or obtaining meaningful employment, which frustrates
young adults. Given the frequency of young adult unemployment, the path to joining and
engaging in groups and movements is easier as there are low opportunity costs.39 Essentially,
without employment occupying your time or cementing you to a place, there is more time in
your schedule that you can devote to getting energized by a movement and participating in it.
Severing ties to your communities become less daunting as your search for better opportunities
supersedes prior communal loyalty or ties. Therefore, the existence of these large youth bulges
serves as “an excellent predictor of political violence.”40 It is vital to comprehend the
demographic situation in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt to predict and understand when
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instances of political violence will occur and determine when the country will devolve into civil
conflict.
While age profoundly affects how you interpret and react to events, the duality of
youthfulness and identifying as a man comes with newfound and unique tendencies. Generally,
young men are “the protagonist of virtually all violent political action.”41 At the core of most
violent political events, young men are typically the main driver and the largest participating
cohort. According to an analysis of the World Values Survey, young men aged 15 to 29 have a
unique propensity for violence; in this crucial metric, it is revealed that young men
overwhelmingly report that they think political violence is justified, are more willing to engage
in it personally, and are more accepting of the fact that participation may cause a rise in the
chance of death.42 Young men have uniquely represented comfort and often excitement around
engaging in a civil conflict, which explains why this group is ultimately responsible for the most
conflict. If they are comfortable with the practice, they are more likely to advocate for it and
propel movements such as the Arab Spring.
All young men are not treated equally. Often, the cohort is divided into two key groups:
married and unmarried. Membership in each of the two sub-groups of young men is a significant
factor in responding and reacting to the social and economic issues addressed earlier and
defining what action you advocate for or engage in. As a young man, your primary focus is
finding a wife or partner. Often in the process of finding a spouse, you are willing to change your
behavior and engage in activity that makes you more marketable to a potential spouse. For
example, young men are more likely to join or engage in violent or revolutionary groups because
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their membership increases their social standing and makes them seem more attractive to a
sexual partner.43 If a prospective partner finds it attractive or powerful that you are engaged in a
noble campaign, they are more likely to engage with you. If men recognize this, this will inform
their future actions and push them to join a movement they otherwise would not. Unmarried men
also have relatively low opportunity costs around entering political campaigns or participating in
political violence. They have little tethering them to their communities and have nothing they are
scared to die for.44 Conversely, married men have more significant opportunity costs associated
with joining a movement or taking violent political action. Typically, married men have spouses
and children they are apprehensive about leaving.45 They will also have to forgo wages and
forfeit their social standing if they choose to walk away from their families and the jobs they rely
on to support their families.46 This significantly complicates the transition from married men to
revolutionaries.
For countries facing unprecedented youth demographic issues, addressing these
underlying structural issues is crucial. Failure to address these issues via policy or market
solutions creates a lot of long-term disenfranchisement and frustration among young men.
Namely, these countries are met with swaths of men that are unemployed and frustrated by their
dire circumstances. Furthermore, this generates widespread unemployment and singleness, which
again compounds disenfranchisement and dissatisfaction. Without a sexual partner, a career, or a
family to keep you busy or anchor you to your community, it is unsurprising that you grow
increasingly angry and would look to movements, revolution, or aggressive conflict to remedy
43
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your situation. These trends underscore the general trajectory of young men in Egypt and Tunisia
and explain why they devolved into revolution.
Youth Unemployment and Social Exclusion
For individuals, periods of unemployment can profoundly affect their personal, financial,
and social conditions. After someone loses their job, they immediately experience a loss in
disposable income and face financial restrictions. Their newfound financial situation complicates
all aspects of life. For these individuals, it becomes nearly impossible to maintain a minimum
standard of living while also balancing participation in their regular social and cultural activities.
Beyond economic harms, unemployment is often tied to “social exclusion.”47 Essentially,
unemployed people begin to feel disconnected from the rest of society. When someone is
unemployed, they lose many of the non-pecuniary benefits associated with
employment—namely, the ability to demonstrate their worth, skills, and competency to the rest
of society.48 Additionally, unemployed people lose their social status and social relations. Society
often looks down on the unemployed, and their status can result in stigmatization and feelings of
insecurity and shame. The loss of a job comes with a lot of society and self-induced stress. These
adverse emotions lead to emotional and physical distress, isolation, and alienation. The duality of
the economic and social pressures contributes to general feelings of social exclusion.
Importantly social exclusion can be evaluated in two ways. First, by understanding what
it means to be excluded versus included. Secondly, by assessing how these conditions result in
the increase or decrease in feelings of vulnerability experienced by these people. Scholars after
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studying unemployed youth contend that social exclusion is the product of six types of structural
exclusion; labor market, economic, institutional, social isolation, and cultural.49 Beginning first
with labor market exclusion, market forces create barriers to employment for those with little
skills. Their inability to secure jobs or reenter the labor market induces feelings of marginality
and compels people to question their place in society.50 Following these feelings, people begin to
experience economic exclusion. Market-induced exclusion leads to financial dependency on the
state and families. Finally, unemployed people continue to feel excluded from private invitations
(institutional exclusion). They cannot use private services such as banks to weather the
uncertainties of life. Instead, they are forced to rely on public institutions meant to serve the
poor. This again causes feelings of dependency and leads to shame. As all of these factors
compound, this causes the unemployed to experience social isolation and retreat from their social
circles and reduces their social contracts.51 As people's quality of life declines, they feel cultural
exclusion because their conditions make it impossible to live according to socially accepted
norms for behavior. They now face social stigma and sanctions from those around them. These
feelings of exclusion add up and enlarge the vulnerability that people feel as they go about their
daily lives.
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Chapter Two: Research Design and Methodology:
To fulfill my research question about the relationship between social dissatisfaction, a
“coming of age crisis,” and the political behavior causing the Arab Spring, I will deploy a dual
case study analysis of Egypt and Tunisia. Both countries illustrate my more significant
theoretical underpinnings about why young men protest and revolt. While contemporary
scholarship on the Arab Spring in both countries typically focuses on the region’s broader
economic and political climate, I argue that it is important to isolate the cohort of young adults
that drove the protests and revolts. This subset of the population's economic and social situation
is vastly different from people in other age ranges. Specifically, 15-29-year-olds in both countries
manifested desires to protest and revolt when the government failed to deliver on the
expectations its citizens had. In the case of Egypt and Tunisia, the financial expectations they had
were informed by the positive economic condition that their parents enjoyed, and they became
accustomed to expecting.
These two cases were chosen because they are comparable in many aspects: Firstly, both
countries have relatively similar norms for males as part of their growing up. Namely, around
marrying, providing for your family, and being employed. Secondly, both countries were
experiencing relatively similar economic, education, and joblessness crisis. Additionally, both
nations similarly had a broken political system riddled with political corruption and nepotism. As
a result, they were ineffective in driving the economic growth needed to launch the next
generation into adulthood. And finally, in the end, both Egyptian and Tunisian protests resulted
in their governments being overthrown. Both countries saw their governments resign and had
new governments installed. Finally, both populations had similar Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving
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Scale results, as reported by Gallop. 52 The scale measures citizens' well-being and breaks down
how they feel into three categories; thriving, struggling, and suffering. In Egypt, across all
income and age groups since 2005, reported a decline in citizens' assessments of their
well-being. In Tunisia, the well-being of all groups has declined at similar rates since 2008. This
is important because both countries’ populations were similarly situated and had nearly the same
path from government satisfaction to desires for regime change and protest. It also reveals that
both countries were on a similar timeline, making them easier to study and compare.
There are several differences between the two case study nations that must be addressed.
In Tunisia, there was an institutional structure that, if run correctly, could have provided the next
generation with the tools for their success. The educational system in Tunisia had long been one
of the strongest in the Arab world; they once had the largest middle-class and a strong organized
labor force.53 However, behind these achievements, leader Ben Ali hid widespread political
corruption, favoritism, and a lack of free expression. The Ali government relied heavily on
favoritism and gave preferential treatment and access to resources to the commercial elites, most
personally related to Ali. In Egypt, the structural elements of the government were slightly
different. The government of President Hosni Mubarak had utterly failed to operate a functional
government. The government's ability to provide essential services severely deteriorated over
time.54 Additionally, his government presented an indifference to widespread unemployment and
growing poverty and relied heavily on bribes. While the relative strengths of their government
52
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institutions differed, I hold that it has little impact on the argument that young men were
propelled to protest because of relative deprivation, an inability to grow up, and societal
pressures. Regardless of the strength of the respective institutions overall, both countries had
similar instances of failing to serve and provide economic opportunities for young men.
Similarly, young men in Tunisia and Egypt were unable to get a job, obtain adequate education
for the modern job market, and failed to have other necessities promised in their social contract
met. For this study, it is sufficient to study the impact of the government's failure on young men
independent from other groups because they were the most active in the protests and
revolutionary acts. Hence, their psychological state and the impact of events on them are most
important.
Dependent Variables
Youth Population and Demographics
To compare and understand the political influence young adults had to drive the Arab
Spring protests and revolutions, it is first necessary to situate their place in both countries'
societies. Essentially, the larger a cohort is within a population, the larger their voice is at the
national political level, and the easier it is for them to drive political change. More specifically,
to illustrate the breadth of the impact of young adults and young men, I will utilize national
demographic data as shown by population pyramids. Essentially, demographic data stratifies the
population into different cohorts. In the case of this study, I will utilize population age data. Age
demographic data breaks down the population into various age ranges and calculates the percent
that each age range cohort makes of the more significant population of the country’s entirety. In
the case of both Egypt and Tunisia, I hypothesize that the size of the youth population,
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compounded with the poor economic and social circumstances they experienced, created the
perfect conditions to not only initiate a revolution and protest, and gave them a large enough
population that their impact led to political change.
Overall Unemployment and Youth Unemployment
To measure youth unemployment, this study estimates the share of the labor force aged
15-24 that are jobless but are available for and actively seeking out work.55 National
unemployment levels are generally accepted as the broadest indicator of economic activity and
the financial lives of everyday citizens in a country. This data is fundamental because
experiencing unemployment, especially among youth, has damaging effects on a community,
their nation, their families, and their happiness with their government’s performance.
Unemployed citizens are less likely to contribute effectively to the development of the national
economy, face social ostracism, and have fewer opportunities to exercise their rights as citizens.
These citizens are often voiceless, have less to spend as consumers, and save less for significant
life events such as weddings and purchasing a home. While unemployed, they also miss out on
vital educational and experiential opportunities by being absent from the workforce where they
would be learning new skills and gaining credentials. I expect that citizens in countries with
higher rates of unemployment are more likely to protest and revolt against their government in
desperation and desire a change in their personal position.
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Chapter Three: Arab World-Historical Perspective
Now that the theoretical frameworks that explain why people and, more specifically,
young men choose to protest and revolt are laid out, it is crucial to zoom in and evaluate the
situation on the ground in the region in the leadup to the Arab Spring. More specifically, it is
important to review the history that predates the onset of the Arab Spring, evaluate the economic
issues dogging the region, and understand the social dynamics between young men, their
societies, and the government. Understanding the socio-cultural frustration young men incurred
while navigating systemic economic hardship is powerful. In the Arab Middle East, young men
could not achieve adulthood as they were often held back by both the government and the market
structure. While it is popular to chalk the Arab Spring as emblematic of efforts of ideological
democratic reform, the more compelling picture evaluates how social issues drove political
action. The Arab Spring was a platform that millions of young Arab Men used to demand that
their social contracts with their governments be fulfilled. In the region, even the most
straightforward social contract that young men can grow up, start productively contributing to
society and raise a family seemed more like a fantasy than reality. The traditional social contract
that governed social behavior was broken for an entire generation. This cohort was trapped in a
perpetual transitory state of “waithood,” in which young men age but cannot achieve many of the
milestones traditionally associated with adulthood. This underlying socio-cultural frustration was
the underlying cause of regional and political unrest. These citizens had not planned to engage in
a revolution, nor did they have aspirational goals about democratizing their homes. Instead, they
were attempting to better their common condition to be on par with the expectations that have
been historically present.
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The Arab Spring is remarkable because of the composition of the protestors. The
movement was incredible because of how many different types of people mobilized in the face of
economic, social, and political adversity. All across the Arab world, you saw people of varying
social status, income brackets, and ages joining in the effort. While middle-class citizens and
some members of the economic elite joined in the action, one group dominated demonstrations
and helmed the movement, young men. Young men aged 15-29 overwhelmingly rallied behind
the movement.
The Arab Spring’s widespread impact and adoption of region-wide desires for protest and
revolt were primarily due to a newfound realization of youth in Egypt, Tunisia, and other
countries in the region that they are not alone in their despair and that they share a common
inaccessible path to adulthood as their brethren across their country, and the region they call
home. Moreover, they shared a concern about being stuck in a perpetual waiting period where
their lives do not advance past adolescence. Beyond that, the movement spread like wildfire as
young men realized they finally had a platform and forum to air these grievances and demand
adequate education, employment, and marriage for all young men in the region.
Beginning of the Story: The Middle East Youth Bulge
For the past three decades, a demographic trap has perpetually plagued the Arab world. In
many Arab countries, birth rates have been ballooning, meaning that, more and more children are
born at unprecedented rates due to improving conditions.56 This leads to a demographic
imbalance with more younger people than older. Simultaneously, citizens are living longer,
healthier lives. As the new generation grows up, they expect a high quality of life, economic
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prosperity, and employment similar to what their parents had. At the same time, they are calling
for a better quality of living, accountability from their governments, and an economy that serves
them.
The underlying demographic crisis truly started to prove problematic and worrisome in
the years leading up to the start of the Arab Spring. In the Arab world, 2010 marked a transition.
Before that year, the impact of ballooning birth rates had little effect. The cohorts born during
this period were merely children. They required little from their government or the market.
Instead, they relied heavily on their parents for support. Importantly, they were supported by past
generations that experienced economic prosperity, a booming job market, and an easy path to
adulthood. By 2011, this large (and ever-growing) subset of the population was phasing out of
childhood and was seeking to “come to age” and phase into adulthood. To quantify the
population, youth under the age of twenty-four made up a little over half the entire population of
the whole Arab world.
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Specifically, in the Middle East, people aged 15-29 accounted for

approximately thirty-three percent of the overall population, as shown in Figure 3. This created
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an incredibly unbalanced society in terms of age cohorts, with far more children being born and
adolescents maturing than ever before. Beyond that, young adults and children were beginning to
outnumber older Arabs. To put the impact of this in context, this means that one in five Arabs is
starting to attempt to complete their education, attain a job, and marry.58 To make matters worse,
another thirty percent of the population is children that similarly will grow up and seek to
achieve the adult milestone outlined previously.59 Essentially, the Arab world and the Middle
East are suddenly faced with millions of people who need to find a place in society, have a job,
and have social resources devoted to them.
The increasingly complex demographic crisis posed a substantial threat to the market and
government. Since more people are entering adulthood than any other generation ever in the
Arab world, there is no adequate infrastructure to support them. More jobs, larger schools, and
more economic opportunities must be available for the millions of Arabs who expect a positive
existence in their home countries. But, there were not. For many nations in the region, the
demographic crisis is only beginning. Even if they catch up with current rates and provide for all
the newly maturing adults, they still are not equipped for an ever-increasing population. Current
models predict that in states such as Egypt and Tunisia, the end of the youth bulge is not until
2030.60 The entire Arab world faces the same issue: how to find a place for large numbers of
youth looking for their niche in society, finding a sense of identity, and hitting the milestones
long associated with adulthood. Their identities are formulated with family formation, schooling,
and initial employment as a youth. The impending demographic crisis, the unequipped market,
and the disorganized government began to reveal the conditions in the region that brewed social
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dissatisfaction that led to the Arab Spring. The sheer number of people “coming to age” was
enough to create a situation whereby people were forcibly excluded from society because there
was insufficient infrastructure to support this population.
Arab Social Contract
While analyzing the demographic crisis is immensely revealing, it is only the beginning
of explaining why the Arab Spring occurred. All over the world, many nations and regions have
a demographic crisis currently or have grappled with them in the past. Notably, only some of
these places have devolved into widespread anti-government protests and revolutions similar to
the Arab Spring. The distinguishing factor between those that do and those that do not is the
relationship between citizens and government, which drives social feelings of belonging. Often,
states and citizens have social contracts that dictate what citizens tolerate and what governments
are expected to provide to ensure harmony. In the Middle East, the impact of the demographic
crisis was worsened by general sentiments of young men across the region that felt their
government violated the Arab social contract and, therefore, they were no longer willing to put
up with what they did before.
In the Arab Middle East, most social agreements between a country's citizens and their
governments go back to the last century. Beginning with decolonization and the independence of
nations in the Middle East in the twentieth century, many citizens and their governments reached
compromises about their respective roles, duties, and responsibilities, which allowed society and
the government to coexist and function. Governments in the region gave certain assurances, and
the citizens agreed to remain at bay in exchange. As part of this informal agreement, the
government promised to provide jobs in the public sector, free education and health, and

42

subsidized fuel. In exchange, citizens “kept their voices low and tolerated some levels of elite

capture in the private-sector.”61 If the government met its end of the bargain, its citizens would
overlook minor corruption and dissatisfaction with their condition and remain complacent. By no
means were citizens living extravagant lives, but they at least had their basic needs met. These
agreements proved exceptionally powerful in the region as they kept citizens content, gave them
the platform to mature into adulthood, gave them hope for a prosperous life, and quelled desires
for change, protest, or revolution.
Beginning in the 2000s, the tides in the region rapidly changed. At this point, there were
drastic factors that impeded the ability of Middle Eastern governments to meet their end of the
social contract. It was clear that the promised benefits had become unsustainable given the rapid
rise in population. Notably, the public sector was no longer equipped to be the first resort,
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national employer.62 The government had become bloated, and there was no room to add to the
headcount. Concurrently, millions of young men sought to enter public service as their dads and
prior generations had done in the past. They, too, wanted to take advantage of the stability
promised in their social contracts. As a result, this cohort of young men shifted to the private
sector for employment. This was a vastly different path than the one that gave their fathers the
perfect launching pad into adulthood and the stability needed to support their family. This shift
was deeply problematic as the private sector similarly had an issue of excess demand for
positions. There were not enough available positions given the rapid boom in young adults and
the unwillingness of the older generations to leave the workforce. The few who could secure a
private sector job, would earn less than their public sector peers, and the quality of the positions
was generally less than what they expected when growing up.63
The presence of a generous social contract made the sting of the demographic and market
crisis issues worse. For any young adult, the inability to secure a well-paying job causes
significant distress because this is often the first indication of maturation. Beyond that, this made
it increasingly challenging to support themselves and their families. But, this pressure was
worsened as young boys in the region grew up watching and hearing about this grand promise
for a prosperous future guaranteed by their governments. Consequently, Arab young men began
to feel “resentment toward their governments, which in their eyes were responsible for their
hardships and motivated them to seek change within their country and region actively.”64 Young
Arab men grew increasingly frustrated that their governments could not meet their end of the
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social contract. As these young men faced these dire circumstances, their discontent with their
governments increased. Beyond general anger, many young men in the region began to question
the place their leaders and the current government had in the future. If the government was not
serving them, why would they put up with discrimination, authoritarianism, and rampant
corruption? As these waves of anger festered in more and more young men over time, this
provided ample fuel for protests and revolutions to spur in the Arab world.
Young Male Unemployment
In the last vicennial, the Arab world has been plagued by widespread unemployment and
underemployment crises. In 2010 during the onset of the Arab Spring, the Middle East faced the
worst unemployment rates globally. At this point, the regional average unemployment rate was
ten percent.65 This trend has persisted across the region for many years, and the region is
expected to remain at the top of the global leaderboard for joblessness. Interestingly, these trends
have persisted despite regional periods of economic growth. For example, between 2000-2008,
when the region faced great economic prosperity and development, the unemployment rates
continued to rise. This dogged the region and left many unemployed citizens with little hope of
improving their personal situations.
While the entire region felt the pain of rampant unemployment, the regional issues
particularly affected young adults aged 15-29. For this cohort, the employment market was far
worse than for their older peers. This population has an arduous path to finding employment in
either the public or private sectors. For the last twenty-five years, youth unemployment rates in
the Middle East region have been the highest globally.66 According to World Bank data, the
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regional average youth unemployment rate was twenty-three percent.67 For young men in the
region, unemployment issues are particularly relevant and taxing, given both market trends and
social norms that designate employment as the first marker of progression toward adulthood.
These young men face exponentially higher unemployment rates than most other subsets within
the region's population. According to World Bank data for 2010, twenty percent of young men
were unemployed, double that of the average for the entire region of all ages and genders.68 It is
crucial to contextualize the issues beyond the statistics. These unemployment rates for young
men in the region mean they face incredibly taxing, frustrating, and lengthy journeys to find
meaningful work. These men entered the job market knowing that it would take years to find
jobs to support themselves and their families. They would have to wait to marry and move out of
their familial homes.
The unemployment crisis only speaks to a fraction of the difficulty young adults and men
faced as they began their path toward adulthood and sought employment. To fully grasp the dire
conditions that these men faced, it is vital also to evaluate labor participation rates because
“unemployment rates only track those who are willingly looking for employment but cannot find
it, and do not include the half of the Arab population... who have given up seeking employment
or never sought work at all.”69 In the Arab world, there is a massive labor participation crisis.
Essentially, fewer members of society of working age are working. In the Arab world, the
employment-to-population rate is approximately forty-five percent.70 This means that more
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Arabs who are typically considered of working age are not engaged in the workforce than those
who are. In many Arab countries, this means that many citizens, including many young men, are
actively choosing to avoid unemployment altogether. Instead, they are taking the nontraditional
path of remaining within their familial homes and are being supported by their parents. Across
the Arab world and the Middle East, millions of young adults and young men are forgoing a
pivotal life event because they are so frustrated by the path ahead. This population is keenly
aware of the unlikelihood that they will be able to find a job, and they have just given up.
Across the Arab world, this youth unemployment and underemployment crisis directly
results from market failure, government inaction, and poor planning. The job market has failed to
offer a sufficient number of new jobs needed to employ the millions of young men seeking to
move to the next phase of their adulthood and get a job. Additionally, this crisis is perpetuated by
governments that have proven either disinterested or unable to create an economically
prosperous nation with the type of job growth needed to support all the new entrants into the job
market. The job market is further complicated by the decreasing public sector, which was once
the first choice unemployment of young men in the region. Without public or private sector
hiring, there are few options for young men who need a job to support themselves and proceed
with important life events tied to maturation.
Across the globe, most cultures utilize employment status as a barometer to measure
adulthood. In many cultures, the path toward adulthood often starts with finding a lucrative first
job. For young adults, your first job provides you with the necessary funds to move out of your
familial home, marry, and start a family. The inability to secure employment stops your ability to
mature. It becomes challenging to achieve the traditional benefits of adulthood or be treated
better than you were as a child by your family if you still live at home and are supported. In the
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Arab world, there is a particular social sensitivity and importance to finding employment for
young men. Across the Middle East, there are meager labor force participation rates for women,
especially young women. As a result, the burden of financial security is frequently left to young
men. Strict social norms govern male behavior, employment status is often a source of
discussion, and unemployment comes with great disappointment and social shunning from
families in the region.71 In the Arab world, young men are a generation in waiting—waiting for
decent jobs and are stuck in a limbo phase of pre-adulthood. Arab young men at all corners of
their life face increased social pressure and experience frustration because they cannot achieve
the fundamentals of finding a job. This generation “continues to be the most disadvantaged
group in terms of higher unemployment rates, lower earnings, and limited job security and
stability, which prompted them to look to their governments.”72 As the appalling unemployment
crisis unfolded, young men repeatedly looked to their governments to provide reform, support
them, and offer policy solutions to help them achieve meaningful employment and personal
financial freedom.73 All across the region, these young men were often met with uninterested or
incapable governments that failed to address the obstacles locking them in place. Their calls
went largely unanswered for years as they suffered and remained in a state of pre-adulthood,
which prompted them to mobilize and advocate for government reforms via Arab Spring
revolutions and protests.
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Failing Education System
Before the Arab Spring, countries in the Arab World made significant strides in public
education for the first time. Across the region in the 1980s, some widespread political reforms
and campaigns sought to expand education access to all.74 These efforts sought to level the
playing field and allow all citizens, regardless of geographic or income status, the opportunity to
get an education. In the beginning, the efforts targeted primary education for young children,
then expanded to secondary and post-secondary education. As a result of these programs, the
region experienced increasing literacy rates and saw far more students attending secondary
school and graduating from college. At face value, it appeared that the region had finally made
progress in a key area needed to elevate people out of poverty and drive the economy.
After a deeper analysis of educational matters in the region, it becomes apparent that the
international community had a misguided understanding of education in the region. Many
international organizations mistook an increase in the quantity of education for the quality. While
more and more students were getting educated, this was a facade as the systems in the region
were broken. In the Arab world, the curriculum misses the mark in many regards. Most students
in the region cannot compete with their international peers, score worse on international
standardized exams, and lack the basic mathematical and communications skills critical to any
non-physical career.75 For many students, their teachers focus solely on memorization and
repetition. Core skills such as creative expression, group work, or debate are often not part of the
curriculum in the classroom. This created a skills mismatch in which the skills they need for
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employment are not the skills they learn in school. This leads to increased frustration among
young men who are most likely to attend school and check off the box society has designated as
the next progression toward adulthood. They are still ill-equipped and unprepared for any job.
Highly Educated but Misinformed, Unemployed, and Unemployable
In the Arab World, there is an overactive but ill-informed belief that the highest quality
employment demands a college education. As a result, families push many students to attend
college even if that is not in their best interest or if they have ascertained the necessary core
competencies to perform positively. These students can still attend college because “access to
universities...is highly dependent on passing national tests designed primarily to measure the
acquisition of facts and knowledge through rote memorization rather than critical and
independent thinking.”76 Essentially, the Arab world's educational system is built around a
preference for sending children to college even though they are ill-equipped for success at
university or in the workplace. The system is rigged to allow students that can memorize instead
of teaching them the critical thinking that is truly necessary. Students pay the price for a poorly
run system that leaves them disadvantaged before stepping foot on a college campus.
Once students enroll in college, both the government-run education system and
underlying social norms fail them. Given the Arab social contract, there is an overemphasis on
public sector employment. Therefore, students are typically encouraged (or, in some instances,
compelled) to study the majors that are most conducive to public sector employment.
Overwhelmingly, Arab students and young men especially study the social sciences or
humanities. Alternatively, very few students study emerging business trends or skills such as
76

Dhillon, Navtej, and Tarik Yousef, eds. Generation in waiting: The unfulfilled promise of
young people in the Middle East. Brookings Institution Press, 2011.
50

engineering, the sciences, technology, medicine, or technical disciplines. This leads to a vast
skills mismatch in the employment market. More people are concentrated in a few majors while
competing for a small subset of the total jobs available. This leaves millions of young men
ill-equipped for the modern economy and exacerbates an already dire unemployment situation.
The fractures in the education system create a unique conundrum for the Arab World.
While many young men are conditioned to believe that more education leads to more
employment, the reality is the opposite. In the Arab world, the more educated a candidate is, the
less likely they are to secure a job.77 The skills mismatch, an inadequate education system, and
an over-educated and unemployed youth male population led to growing resentment from a
generation born into a system that fails them daily. This generation has learned unimportant
skills, watching the promises made to them unravel. Both Arab governments and adults in the
region promised that their hard work in school would benefit them, but it has yet to yield the
rewards initially advertised. As more and more young men faced a similar arduous path, they
began to form unions. They rallied behind collective frustration and called for reformations and
accountability. This is immensely dangerous for regime security.
Failure of Family Formation
Marriage is Off the Table
As referenced earlier, Arab men in the leadup to the Arab Spring were increasingly
financially dependent and unable to find employment. Once you are unemployed and financially
unstable, your chances of marrying someone decrease, and your life is paused as you cannot
achieve a key milestone. To understand why this matters, it is vital to understand the social and
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cultural dynamics that make marriage crucial so that you can understand why and how these
factors drove desires for protest and revolution.
In the Arab world, marriage is the ultimate milestone event that marks the transition from
adolescence to adulthood. For young Arab men, the importance of marriage has been instilled in
them at all stages of growing up. Your parents, families, and peers reinforced the importance of
finding a partner and starting a family with them. The heightened focus on this event is rooted in
religious and cultural norms that hold marriage sacred. There is cultural, physical, and emotional
frustration for a young man unable to marry.78 In the Arab world, sexual intercourse before
marriage is forbidden. The delay in the ability to marry comes with significant sexual frustration.
Beyond physical frustration, there is frustration due to an “increasing gap between sexual
maturation, beginning at puberty, and social maturity, the age at which it is socially responsible
to get married.”79 Essentially, young men are being forced to wait longer and longer to get
married and have sex as their cultures preclude them from getting married before they achieve
financial independence and have a good job. If you have sexual intercourse before marriage, you
commit a grave sin in Islam called Zina.80 While the practice of no sex before marriage is not
solely an Arab phenomenon, it is critical to understand why men in the Arab world were
frustrated enough to protest and revolt. Given the economic and market conditions of the Arab
world, marriage was being delayed.
For Arabs, marriage is not exclusively an institution between two partners. Importantly,
marriage is often an informal social contract between the participants and their societies.
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Marriage is an agreement in which young adults agree to progress to the following stages of their
lives, build a family, and contribute to their nation's economy.81 In the Arab world, “it is only
through marriage that adolescents gain adult status due to social, cultural, and religious norms,
yet young people marry at a later age in the Middle East.”82 In the Arab world, marriage starts
the adult phase of one's life. So, if marriage is delayed, that delays critical events such as having
children and means a delay in acquiring certain cultural privileges, social acceptance, and
fulfilling one's socio-religious duties. It is also important to note that singleness is often looked
down upon.83 As a result, most young men do not choose not to marry, and if they do, they are
often shunned by society. Increasingly, non-married people decide to do so due to financial
burdens. In turn, this means that men that want to marry can only do so after they save enough
money to support themselves and their bride and can afford a wedding whenever that may be.
To add to the male circumstance, much of the region's marriage process is pay-to-play;
every corner you turn within the process involves significant financial responsibility incurred
chiefly by the young man who initiates a marriage. In the Middle East, the average wedding
expense per person to be married is around forty- five thousand dollars.84 This places pressure on
the bride and groom to save enough money to marry. But, the burden on young men is made
worse by Arab cultural norms that place particular social pressures on the man to support his
wife.
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The already overwhelming pressure of meeting marital and financial commitments is
exacerbated by an economic situation in which many people of marriage age are unemployed
and lack financial independence.85 This situation brews tension between the average Middle East
citizen and their state because "as many young people face financial pressures which exacerbate
their already difficult economic, social, sexual, and political anxieties; governments, political
parties, civil society organizations, and political scientists seem to ignore them."86 There is an
apparent social pressure that is being ignored by the political establishment in which men are
growing distinctly frustrated by their unique and dire circumstances in the region
Social Frustration and Perpetual Adolescence
In the Arab world, most young men can relate to the general frustrations and sentiments
expressed by Mohamed Bouazizi. Across the region, millions of young men are trapped by
difficult structural and market conditions of poor education, rampant unemployment, the failure
of family formation, and a distinct inability to achieve financial independence. Concurrently,
they face rigid social norms that govern all aspects of their lives, and they must contend with an
adult population that is quick to judge and shun those who miss the mark on these standards. As
a result, these young men were trying to navigate a problematic social scene and find their own
identities.
While many men were searching for their identity, their societies had already socially
constructed and assigned them roles and set norms about how they were supposed to live. These
norms are based on social and religious factors. Young men are expected to be providers, good
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husbands, fathers, and economic contributors to their home countries. The path to achieving
these goals is specific and clearly defined. Notably, certain milestones must be completed to
progress from childhood to adulthood. More specifically, young men are expected to plan around
being their family's provider. The first step in this process is getting educated and finding
suitable employment. While searching for jobs, they must keep in mind that their wages must be
enough to cover a wedding, the move out of their familial home, and adequate savings to support
their spouse.87 There is immense family and social pressure on these young men to achieve these
goals and fulfill their male “destiny.” These male social norms and standards have been instilled
at all points of their upbringing. For young men, most of their early existence revolves around
obtaining validation from their families and society.
Many young men have experienced symbolic rejection, social shunning, and exclusion
from society because they have failed to meet the normative expectations for young men. They
cannot find a job, cannot afford a wedding, and are taking longer than ever before to achieve
family formation. This left many young men “frustrated by the paucity of jobs that prevented
them from fulfilling their manhood.”88 As a result, these young men are experiencing a failed
transition from childhood to adulthood because market limitations make it nearly impossible for
them to achieve the same milestone their parents did with ease. These young men cannot become
adults in their society and instead stay as “children” well into their thirties and forties. Distinctly,
there are significant social harms, a disgrace to your family, and stigmas attached to those who
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fail to meet these goals.89 This adds a lot of undue pressure onto men solely, that feel pressured to
meet demanding goals that are unlikely given regional economic conditions.
After evaluating the economic trends, and social conditions that Arab young men faced, it
is unsurprising that so many of these men decided to protest, revolt collectively, and call for
government reforms. For these young men, their governments and societies failed them on all
fronts. Their governments could not provide a stable platform for maturation, financial
independence, and proper education. The government could not meet their basic needs, and
politicians shrugged off their grievances, refusing to implement policy solutions to address
systemic issues. Equally culpable are their fellow citizens, who held them to unattainable
standards and rigid norms that left them no room to create their own identity. As a result, they
were left displaced from adulthood’s formal events and were trapped in an indefinite
pre-adulthood phase. The increased pressure and disadvantaged position many Arab young men
faced was fuel to the fire of an already grim existence. Daily, they questioned everything that
was ever promised to them, and all that they could do was seek change, even to improve their
conditions marginally.
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Chapter Four: Egyptian Revolution

The Arab world’s recent upheavals, most notably the Egyptian revolution, quickly
mobilized millions of citizens to local squares, the capital, and the political scene. Following the
ouster of Tunisian President Ben Ali, young men across the country were encouraged by the
rapid success in Tunisia that initiated widespread conversations about political and economic
crises that needed to be addressed to improve the quality of life for all citizens. Likewise, the
Egyptian revolution brought youth politics and social dissatisfaction to the fore. The primary
drivers of the Egyptian revolution may be debated, but unemployment, poor education, failures
of family formation, and underlying social dissatisfaction undeniably played an outsized role.

57

To investigate the cause of the Egyptian revolution, a branch of the broader Arab Spring,
it is first necessary to survey Egypt’s economic and political history. By January 2011, most
citizens had lost their confidence in President Hosni Mubarak and his government. Mubarak’s
various fumbles on television quickly epitomized his government's inefficiency and declining
efficacy. Throughout his rule, the Mubarak government had proved incapable of managing the
country's economic crisis and had a deteriorating ability to provide the basic services expected
by the Arab social contract. In Egypt, young men were not only growing increasingly frustrated
by the ineptness of the government and their declining conditions. They were far more frustrated
by a seeming indifference toward unemployment and financial hardship.90 This alienated
millions of Egyptians, many of whom were unemployed young men, delayed family formation,
and could not move out of their family homes. This cohort also grew increasingly frustrated by
Mubarak’s economic policies, which created significant disparities between the wealthy elites
and the poor (many of which were young men). In addition, his government relied heavily on
foreign aid from international institutions, which forced the adoption of neoliberal policies
favoring deregulation, cutting subsidies, and privatization. These policies encouraged inequality
and created a fracture between the rich and the poor and young. Notably, there was increased
conspicuous consumption among the rich while the young and poor were suffering.91 The
conditions on the ground were increasingly problematic, and poor government management of
the economy meant that most young men had little prospect for a prosperous existence. This left
Egyptian young men frustrated and trapped in a pre-adult phase as they could not achieve the
milestones traditionally designating the ascension from childhood to adulthood. Beyond
frustration with their conditions, they also faced increased social pressure and exclusion from the
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older generation. As this crisis drew out, young men collectively rallied to call for a change at
the top. They did so via protests and ultimately organized a revolution leading to the ouster of
President Hosni Mubarak and his cronies.
Egyptian Demographic Crisis
While Egypt was not unique in facing a demographic crisis, the situation on the ground in
Egypt was far worse than in other countries within the Arab world. From 1950 to 2011 (the onset
of the Arab Spring), the population has grown by more than 378 percent, from 21.5 million
residents to over 81 million residents.92 To give context to this issue, there were more citizens in
Egypt in 2011 than in the entire Middle East region in the last century. However, the sheer
population increase is not enough to explain the onset of the Arab Spring. More important is the
composition of the population. Egypt is endowed with one of the world's youngest populations.
As shown in Figure 6, over 54 percent of the population is composed of the under-twenty-four
cohort. Adding to the demographic pressure are the 24 million Egyptians between the age of
fifteen and twenty-nine, typically the subset of the population engaged in the transition from
childhood to adulthood. The underlying demographic crisis is particularly revealing when
analyzed with the market and political conditions in the backdrop. As more and more young
adults (and men) were aging out of childhood, there was an expectation that they would be able
to achieve financial independence, find employment, secure an education, and achieve
adulthood. However, the incompetence of the Mubarak government failed to manage this crisis
and left this generation without a stable launching pad. The government was already limiting the
services they offered, and now there would be millions of more citizens who would expect
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access to these government services. The government bureaucracy was ill-equipped to serve
these citizens’ needs, and the market equally was ill-equipped to hire these young men. These
conditions left a dominant subset of the population dissatisfied with a government that failed to
meet the basic needs promised to them. They were not necessarily frustrated by their conditions
but more by their governments’ promises never fulfilled.

Egypt’s Social Contract and Political History
In Egypt, the modern iteration of the social contract dates back to 1952. That year, an
agreement was reached between the government, military, and citizens. Through state and citizen
negotiations, the social contract allows the state to “dispense with the civil rights” of its citizens,
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and citizens agree to tolerate a shambolic, corrupt, and inefficient government.93 While an
agreement was reached to allow these three entities to coexist, the reality on the ground was very
different. All of the initial deal stakeholders had diverging expectations, and two (the
government and military) failed to live up to their expectations. The Egyptian government used
its economic power to manipulate the public on the ground. They could do so because they were
the leading provider of most things.94 This unequal relationship divided society and the country
into two groups, the political and military elites, and Egypt’s marginalized citizens. These
citizens had to trust that their government would provide for them, and they had no other places
to look for support as there was little private sector presence in the country.
At the end of the twentieth century, there was a changing tide. As President Mubarak and
others rose to power, more pressure was put on the government to look internally and to consider
how citizens were feeling about economic, social, and political issues.95 Citizens were beginning
to depart from the blind faith in past governments. The citizen's sentiment was at least partially a
new barometer and consideration when decisions were made. At this point, citizens started to
express an interest in expanding the private sector, increasing opportunities, and increasing
youths' roles in government. At first, this resulted in several younger and pro-business cabinet
members to power. However, the old guard in government did whatever they could to resist these
efforts. As a compromise, President Mubarak's government began to provide at least some
support to support and encourage private sector business and investment. While young people
had advocated for this because they realized that the old public sector system was failing them,
the new private system was equally one-sided and incapable because the government exerted too
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much influence on it, which quelled organic growth. The government favored private sector
businesses that agreed with their politics and respected the military.96 The government
emboldened those invested in their reign. This did a significant disservice to the average citizen,
who again could not find the support they needed. If the market was more unrestricted, more
organic growth could create the jobs or economic opportunities that young men needed as they
entered the employment market. Young men were particularly disenfranchised by a system that,
even when updated, still lacked the resources or opportunities they needed to launch their own
lives and allow them to become adults.
Failure of Egypt’s Education System
Beginning in 1954, under President Gamal Nasser, expanding access to education became
a core component of Egypt’s modernization project. President Nasser implemented a phased
approach to expanding educational access. First, all primary and secondary schools would be
free. Several years later, the government included access to higher education as part of this
policy. Notably, President Nasser made wide-sweeping promises that all college graduates would
be able to find employment in the public sector.97 This promise had two effects: first, it drove
post-secondary educational enrollments, and secondly, it incorporated a newfound guarantee into
the Egyptian social contract. From that point forward, young men expected their education to
guarantee employment and thus stability in their finances and lives. Moreover, as education
levels rise, the expectations about job quality and living standards while married also rise. This
increases pressure from citizens on their governments to guarantee these conditions.
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In the ensuing years, demands for access to education surpassed the availability of
resources to educate the young men that sought a degree. Egypt’s government had failed to plan
for or allocate enough resources to build the educational infrastructure needed to educate the
massive influx of young adults seeking to enter social society through several different
administrations. Egypt’s government implemented poorly executed plans to expand educational
institutions to address this issue quickly. They hired ill-equipped teachers and packed school
buildings in dire conditions with thousands of more students than they were built for.98 The
problem worsened as students were underprepared and would go to college. These students
attended college in droves because the expectation that you go and the promise that it would
boost your condition was enshrined in Egyptian culture.
For young men that attended college, their outcomes were not much better than those
who chose to forgo post-secondary education. The higher education system in Egypt, which is
dominated by public options, was largely ineffective and failed to deliver on the promises made
to young men. The educational system heavily favored memorization, was built to prepare future
applicants for public sector employment, and rejected vocational training. Egypt had a
centralized educational system which meant that the central government in Cairo led the
curriculum and set standards. The pedagogical approach preferred by the government focused on
the memorization of facts. Students rarely engaged in debate or critical thinking. Instead, they
memorized facts to prepare for public-sector employment exams. Egypt’s government also
implemented restrictive rules about what subjects could be taught and what people could major
in. More specifically, they limited the number of students who could concentrate on scientific,
technical, and engineering subjects.99 Instead, the government overemphasized the humanities
98
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and social sciences, which unsurprisingly were the favored concentrations of public sector
applicants. The government did so despite the reality that students would be better suited looking
to the private sector for employment, given the excess demand and finite spots for public sector
positions. The government's actions also crippled the young generations’ ability to enter
emerging industries such as technology, biomedical, and computer science. At all points,
Egyptian education failed young men and left them frustrated. Their education left them
underprepared for a modern economy, rendered them unemployable, and sold them an illusion of
guaranteed comfort via public sector employment. They grew increasingly dissatisfied as they
felt the burn of the government's misdirection and ineffectiveness in this key area. The only
remedy to improve their condition for young men was to replace the government with a
better-suited one.
Egyptian Youth Unemployment Crisis
In Egypt, the labor market is incredibly destitute. The current market dynamics are
primarily a condition of several factors—first, an impending demographic crisis whereby there
are far more prospective entrants than jobs. Secondly, a misaligned social dynamic that favors
public sector employment. And finally, an ineffective educational system leaves young men
unequipped and unprepared for the modern economy, resulting in overeducation and
unemployment.
Across Egypt, there is a massive problem with both unemployment and
underemployment. The average unemployment rate for all age groups was 11 percent.100

100

“Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate) - Middle East &
North Africa.” The World Bank, The World Bank,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=EG
64

Interestingly, the national unemployment issues are far worse for young men aged 15-29. As
shown in Figure 7, in the two-year period from 2009 to 2011, unemployment increased from 15
percent to nearly 26 percent (+11%) for young men. Overwhelmingly, young men are left
unemployed with little hope that they will be able to find a stable career to support themselves or
their families.

In Egypt, the impending demographic crisis led to an increase in the number of young
men that needed to enter the workforce. Millions of men under thirty were looking for their first
job to fulfill their male destiny as a provider and participants in the economy. Unfortunately,
there was a low chance that they would be able to find a job for these young men. This is due
mainly because of social norms that have made public sector employment preferable. As people
stay in their positions longer and more young people grow up in Egypt, there is an imbalance
between the number of new jobs needed and those available.101 An alternative, albeit rare path, is
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to look for private sector employment. Unfortunately, the market is also unprepared for the
surplus of young men looking for jobs because the private sector is incredibly tiny, given the
towering presence of the government as the provider of most things. This was especially
frustrating for the new generation of young men who grew up watching their parents achieve
stable employment with ease. To give context to the change in conditions for young male
employment, it is helpful to evaluate employment odds in the twentieth century versus the years
before the Egyptian revolution. The modeled candidate is a young man born between 1971 and
1975, with secondary education, a son of a public sector employee, and who lives in Cairo. This
young man has a 2.4 percent probability of getting a poor job, a 59 percent probability of getting
a fair job, a 38 percent probability of getting a “good” first job, and a 24 percent probability of
securing a public sector job. A similar candidate born twenty years later has more than double
the likelihood of getting a poor job as his first job, a 12 percent reduction in the probability of
getting a good job, and a 15 percent reduction securing public sector employment.102 This
represents a significant deterioration of the labor market quality over time. The problem is far
worse in the twenty-first century than any other point. The employment frustration grows as you
climb the educational ladder.
As education levels rise, the expectations about job quality and standards of living within
marriage also increase because young people’s ability to obtain good jobs relatively quickly
appears to be declining in the context of a more competitive and informalized labor market in
Egypt. In the labor market, most new labor market entrants are candidates who possess
post-secondary degrees.103 Notably, nearly 70 percent of young men entering the labor force fall
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within this category. This means that millions of young men in Egypt are overeducated and
unemployed.
Young men in Egypt are rightfully frustrated that their governments failed to deliver on
key promises around employment. First, their governments had assured them that they would be
guaranteed public service employment. That promise failed as there were too many new labor
market entrants for the government to hire all of them. Then, the government failed to meet its
promise that the market would have a place for them to find employment in the private sector.
This subset of the labor market was also overwhelmed and unprepared to take on millions of new
young men. Finally, the government failed to deliver on guarantees that advanced education
guarantees a well-paying career. Instead, there were millions of overeducated and unemployed
young men. After taking all of these failed promises together, it is unsurprising that men were
socially dissatisfied and frustrated with Egypt’s government. These young men wasted their time
to a degree, were ill-equipped for any role outside of the public sector, and had to prolong key
social and maturation events because their dire personal financial conditions were not conducive
to achieving the roadblocks to becoming a socialized adult. Therefore, young men had to look
beyond their government for a change.
Failure of Family Formation
For young men in Egypt, their progression toward adulthood is often marked by their
ability to live within certain social norms around marriage. Traditionally, these Arab men are
supposed to base their entire existence around building their “nest egg” required for family
formation. Their priorities are to save money and start a family. In Egypt, this process usually
6, no. 2, pp. 45-70. Lehigh University Library and Technology Services. 8A East Packer Avenue,
Fairchild Martindale Library Room 514, Bethlehem, PA 18015, 2020.
67

culminates when a young man is between twenty-five and thirty years old when they find a
fiancée.104 After finding a fiancée, young men in Egypt are expected to marry and begin to have
children quickly. Alternatively, many young men are single well into their thirties in the region.
This cohort is typically unmarried out of economic necessity and faces continuous social
pressure and criticism for failing to adhere to the social norms emphasizing marriage.105 The
social standing of a young man can be squandered if he fails to earn and save enough, get
engaged, rent or buy an apartment, and purchase the furniture in his home. All of these are
predetermined social norms that men must contend with. There is a considerable amount of
pressure placed on young men in their formative years. They have little choice in dictating their
path toward adulthood. Interestingly, in Egypt, there is a “marital crisis” occurring. Young men
are frequently putting off marriage as they have difficulty finding well-paying employment and
thus cannot save for their wedding.
In Egypt, society uses a young man's marital status to determine their social standing.
This is incredibly stressful, especially given the outsized social, economic, and cultural costs of
marrying in the Arab World. In Egypt, approximately 70 percent of the cost of marriage is the
man’s responsibility.106 In the Arab world, marriage does not come cheap. The actual ceremony
and the following steps are extremely costly and include many expenses. In 1999, the average
wedding cost was 20,194 Egyptian pounds.107 That was equivalent to eleven times annual
household expenditures. By 2005, this figure increased to over 32,000 Egyptian pounds.
Currently, the average cost of a wedding in Egypt is equivalent to 43 months of the total earnings
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of both the groom and his father.108 As the prices of weddings in Egypt increase, more and more
men will grow socially frustrated and dissatisfied that they have to put off marriage because they
cannot afford the process with their limited employment opportunities. This situation brews
anger and frustration with an Egyptian government that ignores the social dynamics that young
men face due to poor economic conditions.
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Chapter Five: Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia

On December 18, 2010, the day after Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in Sidi
Bouzid, Tunisia was engulfed in protest as tensions between the government and everyday
citizens rebelled. That day marked the start of the Tunisian revolution, also known as the Jasmine
revolution. For the next twenty-eight days, in squares and cities all across the country, there was
an intensive campaign of civil resistance that ultimately led to the ouster of President Ben Ali
and ignited a flame that spread throughout the entirety of the Arab world.
On the ground, thousands of Tunisians occupied city squares and streets. These
protestors, primarily young men, stood outside for days with little reservations or fear of leaving
their homes. Most protestors embraced occupying outdoor venues because they had little to go
home to. Their efforts to protest were their last chance to call for the changes needed to eliminate
the widespread economic, social, and political dissatisfaction they experienced. Across the
70

country, young men were collectively frustrated by a crisis whereby the economy failed to create
jobs for a highly educated population, income inequality was rampant, and young men were left
in an eternal state of pre-adulthood because of their financial constraints. As a result, they were
forced to engage in widespread protests and later revolutions. Consequently, the actions of
Tunisian protestors would serve as the model and catalyst for the subsequent revolutions that
popped up throughout much of the Arab world. Their efforts would forever change how
countries interact with their citizens and the region's dynamics.
To grasp the roots of the Jasmine revolution, it is essential to examine further the
economic, social, and political history of Tunisia. President Ben Ali was the first authoritarian
leader in the Arab world to lose his country to mass protest. Initially, his ouster came as a
surprise to most in the region and globally. For a long time, Tunisia held the record for one of the
best educational systems in the Arab world, had a thriving middle-class, and a strongly organized
and dynamic labor force.109 The Ali government carefully crafted the country's outward-facing
image. On the world stage, the government presented Tunisia as a model nation in the region;
modern, investable, technologically driven, and tourist-friendly. The government’s primary focus
was luring foreign investments and not managing citizens' needs. This false outwardly facing
image made it unbelievable that the country would diverge into widespread protests and made it
seem as if the citizens lived in an Arab utopia.
Retrospectively, once you move past the fallacious government depictions of the ground
conditions, it becomes far more apparent why thousands of young men engaged in mass protest
and overthrew the Ali government. The romanticized conditions on the ground severely lagged
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reality. Throughout President Ali’s rule, his government restricted political dissent and curbed
most forms of public expression. Beyond rampant repression, there was little prospect for
prosperity for a large subset of the population, mostly youths and young men. Most government
actions revolved around securing international investments that rarely made it back to the
citizens. While present, corruption from the Ali government was pervasive. The government did
not rely on the prototypical regional bribes, which forced most other Arabs to pay small daily
bribes to officers on the street or government officials. Instead, the government was well
coordinated and discreetly funneled all major business and investments to the relatives of
President Ali. 110 Therefore, it was more complicated for people to realize that they were being
taken advantage of by their government and rampant corruption. This also meant that the
government could successfully administer civil society and government services; they just chose
not to. Across Tunisia, there was a large generational gap. The younger generation, led chiefly by
young men, challenged the preexisting system more. They noticed that the government could
adequately function even if it did not. They also grew increasingly frustrated that their
government and political leaders were not adequately sharing their wealth. They were conducive
to driving the economic growth desperately needed to employ a highly educated population.
Furthermore, they looked more to the prospect of implementing a new clean, efficient, and
modern government to replace their preexisting one. The younger generation was far more in
tune and informed, and they saw protest and revolution as the only way they could reform a
system that perpetually failed them. These young men wanted the lives their parents enjoyed, and
they were willing to put in the hard work to make the changes needed to secure their futures.
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Tunisian Demographic Crisis
In the Arab world, many countries have long faced burgeoning populations that
complicate social integration and economic conditions. Essentially, ballooning populations
complicate the ability of the government to distribute social and essential services and the market
stalls as there are insufficient jobs. Tunisia has perpetuated and fallen victim to many of the same
trends that its peer nations in the Arab world have, even though it is generally in the middle of
the pack in population size. To contextualize the demographic history, from 1950 to 2010 (the
onset of the Jasmine revolution), the country’s total population has grown by 194 percent, from
3.6 million citizens to approximately 10.6 million.111 Over the last several decades, the massive
influxes in population have represented a significant threat to the efficacy of the Tunisian
government that must grapple with providing adequate education and jobs and maintaining the
standards of living for their ever-expanding middle-class. To further complicate matters, the
Tunisian government has witnessed asymmetrical population growth in which specific segments
of the population have expanded while others have not. Namely, there has been an outsized
increase in the country's youth population. According to Figure 9, the youth cohort (15-29 years
old) made up 29 percent of the overall population and thus was a significant segment of the
population growth. This cohort also accounted for nearly 43 percent of the working-age
population. 112 Importantly, in Tunisia, the population's median age is 29. This means that the
country has an “early worker-bulge” rather than the youth bulge that other countries in the Arab
world had.
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By 2010 when the Jasmine revolution picked up steam, the most prominent social cohort
in the country was older youth who experienced very unique social, cultural, and economic
challenges. Traditionally, young adults toward the end of the “youth” age range are engaged in
the final stages of their search for a long-term career and are married or are in the final phases of
their pre-marriage journey with a proposal and a wedding imminent. For Tunisia, this meant that
the country had a substantial population ready to progress to critical phases of their lives but had
a government that actively chose to misuse and misdirect government resources away from aid to
their citizens to help them achieve their goals. Instead, preferring to use financial resources for
personal gain corruptly. One of the country’s most prominent social and political blocks was the
most frustrated. This begins to explain how and why the Jasmine revolution began. This explains
why young adults were led by the country's young men, took to the streets, and overthrew their
government.
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Tunisian Social Contract and Political History
The Tunisian social contract is a complex case, given the longevity of President Ben Ali’s
rule. President Ali has held executive office since the bloodless coup d’etat that removed
President Habib Bourguiba. This meant that for many Tunisians, particularly young men, most of
the social contract that they were accustomed to was defined by President Ali and his
authoritarian regime.
Beginning with President Ali’s rise to power in 1987, political repression and an
authoritarian system propped up the picture of stability between the state and its citizens.
However, over time, the country became one of the most repressive and had the most
authoritarian regime in the Arab world. The country had an “absolute dictatorship with a
modernist face.”113 Essentially, President Ali controlled most aspects of life but often hid the
behavior as part of an orchestrated campaign to paint the government in the best light. Across the
country, the government committed widespread human rights violations, let high-level corruption
run rampant, and removed most avenues for political dissatisfaction. During his rule, all spaces
for expression were shuttered, including the media, research centers, and
non-government-backed social organizations.
Even though the conditions in Tunisia were dire, many citizens were willing to put their
frustrations aside. For decades, the Ali government-provided economic and social gains to large
segments of the population. Namely, employment, education, and the foundation for a
prosperous middle-class life. Moreover, citizens engaged in a complicated informal social
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arrangement with their government. Citizens promised legitimacy and political stability in
exchange for the government guaranteeing the aforementioned social and economic conditions.
In the years leading up to the Jasmine revolution, the social contract began to break down
as the government failed to meet its end of the bargain. Quickly, the Ali government became
incapable of adequately managing the national economy. Since the government redistributed
foreign investment and tax funds to Ali’s family, there was no longer organic economic growth.
Therefore, the economy was increasingly unable to create jobs for an educated labor force.
Furthermore, there was an increased shift to poorly paid jobs in the informal sector and rising
income inequality and regional disparities across the country.114 As the government floundered,
the population that felt the impact the most was young men. Given the demographic breakdown
of Tunisia, young adults were the most common cohort to have their dreams of employment
robbed and to experience the dire financial conditions on the ground. This also meant that this
population was the first to become frustrated by the breakdown of the social contract that once
made it bearable to tolerate oppression. Many young men questioned why they were suffering
despite foreign investment and extensive education. They also asked why they would tolerate
discrimination and oppression if their needs and expectations went unmet.
As the social contract broke down, there were efforts to reform the informal agreement
between the government and citizens. In several instances, young men collectively criticized the
government or advocated for opposing reformist parties. These young men were trying to ease
their socio-economic hardships by calling for reforms and renegotiating what they expected from
their government. By 2005, President Ali became increasingly hostile and made all political
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decisions. He became close-minded and refused any agreement renegotiation between the state
and its citizens. Instead, he preferred that citizens adhere to the social contract, maintain political
stability and guarantee his legitimacy even though the government made no attempts to stick to
their agreement. He thought his citizens would remain tolerant of his unjust practices the same
way they did when his government-provided jobs and education and leveled the playing field.
President Ali was wrong, and young men across the country were quick to convert their calls for
a solution to their socioeconomic grievances to regime change and an ouster of President Ali.
These young men were no longer willing to tolerate what they once did. They were comfortable
protesting and engaging in revolutionary acts because they had little positive things to keep them
grounded.
Rampant Young Male Unemployment
One of the root causes of social dissatisfaction is the lack of opportunities available to
young men. Namely, issues of rampant unemployment and underemployment of young men. The
unemployment crisis is not unique to Tunisia, but the key driving factors are unique. Namely, a
demographic situation whereby there are more entrants than jobs within the labor market,
unevenly distributed age cohorts, and issues of education and skills mismatch within the labor
market.
In Tunisia, the timeline of unemployment trends is exceptionally revealing. In the early
2000s, the country saw unemployment rates broadly drop. In 2005, the unemployment rates were
12.9 percent. In 2006 and 2007, the unemployment rates dropped steadily to 12.5 and 12.4
percent. Notably, however, unemployment increased to 13.1 percent in 2010, the year of the
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onset of the Jasmine revolution.115 This far surpassed the world average unemployment rate of 6
percent. While this already depicts a dire situation, the conditions in Tunisia were especially
difficult for youth broadly and young men more specifically. Tunisia’s youth unemployment rate
was unusually high for global standards at 30.7 percent. This means that youth aged 14-29 were
nearly three times as likely to be unemployed than the broader average within their home
country. If you expanded the youth cohort to include people from 14 to 35 years old, this cohort
would be responsible for 85 percent of the unemployed.116 From 2005 to 2009, labor data from
the United Nations shows that unemployment among younger-aged groups steadily increased
over time, while for older cohorts, the rates dropped annually. For 15-24-year-olds,
unemployment rose from 28 to 31 percent, and for 25-35 years, it increased from 17 to 19
percent.117 An essential subset of the youth population to pay attention to is young men because
they drove the actual protests and contributed to most of the revolutionary acts in the Jasmine
revolution. In 2010, as noted in Figure 10, nearly 28 percent of young men aged 15-29
experienced unemployment. Young men in Tunisia are overwhelmingly unemployed and are left
angry that they can not afford the necessities of life or the cost of adulthood. This leaves many
men with little else to do but protest.
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In Tunisia, the labor market had many complexities, and the impact of unemployment
was not evenly distributed across all segments of society. The brunt of the joblessness crisis was
felt by young men between the ages of 15 and 29 years old. This subset of the population
experienced declining job prospects over time. While they had less and less of a chance of
ascertaining employment over the years, the older generation did not undergo the same hardship.
The older generation had their needs met by the government and was adequately employed.
Therefore, they were far more willing to tolerate government repression or corruption. Beyond
varying degrees of hardship, the sheer increase in the youth population meant far more expected
entrants to the job market than a need for headcount among the private sector, the principal
employer in Tunisia. Employment is essentially a numbers game, and there is little you could do
to increase your odds of unemployment since there are so many young men entering the
workforce but too little economic or job growth to support that. The unique unemployment
challenge for young men adds to why young men were so willing to reform their government and
engage in Jasmine revolution protests and revolutionary calls.
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In the leadup to the Jasmine revolution, the greatest threat to the security of President
Ali’s regime was young men that were unemployed, highly educated, and economically
disadvantaged. These young men had little hope for improvement to their conditions and had
little choice but to turn to protests. To contextualize the gravity of the situation, in Tunisia,
700,000 of 10.6 million citizens were unemployed, and the largest cohort of this was nearly
170,000 college graduates.118 The angriest segment of the population was well incentivized and
enraged by the inequities and corruption faced. The Tunisian government placed too many
barriers on their path to adulthood by creating an economy where nearly no one could secure
adequate employment. These young men were trapped in a perpetual pre-adulthood phase, and
the only solution to their problems was employment. A well-paying job would guarantee
financial freedom and the ability for young men to mature out of society's mold of childhood.
They relied on work to support their families and settle down. But this was off the table for
many. Consequently, a well-intentioned revolution spurred across Tunisia.
Delayed Family Formation and Marriage: Economic and Employment Factors
Like most other countries in the Arab world, Tunisia maintains the centrality of marriage
and family formation in the transition to adulthood. Marriage is nearly universal and is expected
of all men growing up in the country. Notably, however, in Tunisia, the average age of marriage
for young men goes into the early thirties (33).119 This is compared to Egypt and others in the
region, where men typically marry by their twenties. The disparity in young male marriage in
Tunisia is not because of differing norms around marriage. Instead, the complicated economic
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and political environments have led to a delay in marriages and adulthood and caused conflict
between social expectations and reality.
The rise in educational attainment and a deteriorating labor market have pushed young
men further away from the social norms governing marriage. The parents of Tunisia's young men
continually put pressure on their sons if they opt to delay marriage. Often, they ostracize,
criticize, and shun them. While marriage norms are vital to family formation, personal financial
security is also a significant factor. Young men are expected to quickly marry and must attain
high-quality and well-paying public or private sector jobs. A job that includes executive social
benefits. These two norms are often contradictory as the labor market is not conducive to finding
high-quality employment quickly. It is tough to meet both expectations. Often, it's easiest to
either marry swiftly and wait for an excellent job until after, or wait for a good job and marry
later. Many young men thought the best way to balance the two was to engage in strategic
queuing behavior.120 Essentially, young men forgo employment to wait for public sector or
private sector jobs with higher pay, more benefits, and better working conditions. Young men are
forced to contend with a challenging normative landscape in which they are placed between a
“rock and a hard place.” There were far more high-quality jobs in Tunisia than elsewhere, so
men were more likely to take this risk. Importantly, however, men are still forced to wait
extended periods to marry, during this practice and are pushing off their ascension into
adulthood. Beyond that, men face societal pressure and ostracization at all corners regardless of
their decisions.
As a result of delayed employment, young Tunisian men are also frustratingly forced to
put off their marriages. In Tunisia, the cost of a wedding is exorbitant, and the burden is
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primarily placed on the groom and his family. Notably, in Tunisia, there is a norm around
homeownership before marriage.121 This means that men who do not have a job or are waiting
for one can not marry because they do not meet the minimum financial threshold, which is
frustrating. These men cannot enter a marriage without financial security, and they will not
achieve that since they have no salary coming in. Resource accumulation (or saving) from
employment is a critical component of the Tunisian marriage social scene as there are high
upfront marriage costs that young men are expected to pay for with their wages.122 Ultimately,
young men were unable to marry and were left frustrated that they had to wait well into their
thirties because of market economic conditions that the government failed to address.
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Conclusion:
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine how social dissatisfaction in both the
Egyptian and Jasmine revolutions led to mass protest and, ultimately, revolution. To emphasize
the importance of social dissatisfaction as a driver of these events, I investigate the roots of why
young men in the region were particularly dissatisfied, namely, by evaluating the underlying
social norms that drive the male mindset and by showing how critical social, political, and
economic factors prevented specific social standards governing the path to adulthood were left
incomplete.
How did two countries with relatively similar economic and political situations as many
other developing or authoritarian countries divulge into revolution while others historically have
not? I propose that the underlying social fabric is the difference between countries such as Egypt
and Tunisia and others in the world who have not had the same revolutions despite similar
conditions. Both Egypt and Tunisia share similar social contracts and exist against the backdrop
of Arab social norms, which emphasize employment, marriage, and male financial
independence. The data suggests that the conditions on the ground were dire: young men were
unemployed, unemployable, highly educated, and unable to marry. But this was not enough to
frustrate them. Instead, they were pushed over the edge by a painful economic condition that was
compounded with social exclusions, ostracism, and social pressure at all points in their
maturation process. Young Arab men in these countries were given excessive pressure. They
were blamed for their inability to marry or get a job despite it being the fault of past generations
and poor management of authoritarian regimes.
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Young men in the region were trapped by market, structural, and social conditions of
poor education, unemployment, and failure of family formation—in addition to an older
generation quick to compare their path and judge. These young men were trying to find their
place in Arab society while experiencing constant social rejection. Norms in the Arab world limit
male worth to being a husband, father, and financial contributor to their communities. These
young men, unable to contribute to society or their families, felt less than. Beyond emotional
frustration, adult married men’s elevated place in Arab culture meant that men who were not yet
married and considered adults had a second-class position in their social structures. They were in
a sexual, religious, and social state of pre-adulthood, which meant they could only do the little
things relegated to children.
Young men marrying further into their thirties and therefore prolonging their childhood
grew resentful of the socially constructed identity they were supposed to model. They also grew
frustrated by their relative position in society compared to the older generation and peers who
secured adequate employment and married. These young men watched others their age have a
family, get married, and play an outsized role in the social scene, which angered them. Some
young men were forced to live at home longer and were under their parents' watch for longer.
They had little independence and were essentially children being told what to do by their moms.
Given that most of their social pressure arises from economic conditions preventing
social milestones of adulthood, their social frustration quickly converted to political frustration.
Their efforts began modestly, solely attempting to improve economic marginalization and reform
the country quickly escalated to desires for regime change. Politicians, policymakers, business
leaders, and academics must address these timely issues. Given that the demographic crisis will
persist in the region, unemployment continues to rise, and marriage is delayed further, the region
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is likely to experience events like the Arab spring again. The frustration of young men will
continue to compound, and they must not be ignored because they have proven their ability to
organize and willingness to advocate for changes to the status quo.
After writing this thesis, I hope to lay the foundation for new scholarship in two bodies of
literature. First, more countries in the region may be thoroughly studied so that there is more
work about social dissatisfaction and norms driving behavior differently across the Arab world in
2010, 2011, and 2012. Second, that there will be an increased reliance on social factors and
normative analysis done in conjunction with economic analysis to situate crises and explain their
roots. Finally, I hope this thesis can further a new body of literature that studies young men (or
youth) as a distinct body of politics. This study has proved that young men have their desires,
political agency, norms, organizing mechanisms, and have a standard set of values. We
distinguish many other types of politics, such as feminist politics, marginalized group politics,
and ethnic politics. We should similarly independently and uniquely study young adults and
young males, especially since this population has led most recent political trends including
insurgency and ISIS in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, and others. We need to pay more
attention to this cohort to spot bad behavior or events far in advance.
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